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ABSTRACT 
 Developing democracies, especially in countries such as Sierra Leone, that have 
experienced military interventions in politics, face challenges in establishing civilian 
control over their armed forces. Until the UK-led post-war defense reform of 2002, Sierra 
Leone’s military was politicized and had a history of intervening in politics following the 
country’s independence in 1961. While the government is still consolidating post-reform 
gains, attendant problems of civilian control are apparent. Using a case study method, this 
thesis investigates the challenges to civilian control of the military in Sierra Leone. The 
study tests four hypotheses that relate to military prerogatives, politicization of the 
military and acceptance of civilian supremacy, engagement in domestic security, and 
limited civilian defense expertise or interest. The thesis finds that military engagement in 
domestic security and civilian leadership’s limited defense expertise or interest pose 
potential risks to democratic civilian control of the military. The risks of heightened 
military prerogatives and politicization are currently low, making them less worrisome. 
Failing to address these two challenges, however, increases the likelihood for the latter 
two to become risks as all four factors are found interrelated. The thesis recommends 
policy action to enhance and strengthen military acceptance of civilian supremacy, 
civilian defense expertise and interest, institutional control, and resource provision. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sierra Leone armed forces have been an influential actor in the country’s 
political history since Sierra Leone’s independence in 1961.1 Indeed, the country has a 
long tradition of military interventions in politics, beginning in 1967 when, during the 
political struggles between the two existing political parties, the military overthrew the 
elected civilian government.2 This military intervention led to counter-coups two days after 
and in 1968, and subsequently, the military handed over power to the civilian leadership 
of the All People’s Congress party (APC) in the same year of 1968.3 Similarly, in 1992, a 
group of military officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew the one-party rule 
of the APC and created a military regime called the National Provisional Ruling Council 
that ruled until 2005.4 During that time, and amidst the background of a civil war, another 
coup occurred in the mid-1990s. This coup was carried out by elements of the then Sierra 
Leone Army (SLA) led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in collaboration with rebels of the 
Revolutionary United Front led by an ex-military corporal—Foday Sankoh—who wanted 
to replace the APC regime for allegations of poor governance, corruption, national 
hardship, and ethnic divide.5 The civil war continued until 2001, even after a democratic 
transfer of power in 1996. Since then, Sierra Leone has striven to consolidate its democracy 
by holding regular democratic elections and endeavoring to build democratic institutions, 
including civilian control of the military.  
 
1 University of Central Arkansas, Dept. of Political Science, “Sierra Leone (1961-Present),” accessed 
March 1, 2020, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/sierra-leone-1961-
present/. 
2 Christopher Allen, “Sierra Leone Politics since Independence,” African Affairs 67, no. 269 (1968): 
306. 
3 Humphrey J. Fisher, “Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 7, no. 4 (December 1969): 611–13, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00018863. 
4 University of Central Arkansas, Dept. of Political Science, “Sierra Leone (1961-Present)”; C. 
Magbaily Fyle, “The Military and Civil Society in Sierra Leone: The 1992 Military Coup d’Etat,” Africa 
Development / Afrique et Développement 19, no. 2 (1994): 134. 
5 Fyle, “The Military and Civil Society in Sierra Leone,” 133. 
2 
Yet, given Sierra Leone’s multiple military interventions in politics, the 
relationship between the military and the civilian political leadership has been contentious. 
The relationship started to improve in the early 2000s, when the military started a British-
led postwar security sector reform program, which included a military transformation 
element.6 During this period, the reform process resulted in the creation of the Office of 
National Security that coordinates all security matters in the country; a civilian-led 
Ministry of Defense; and legislative oversight of the armed forces. The objective of these 
reforms is to place the armed forces in a democratic framework. Notwithstanding these 
reforms, democratic civilian control of the military remains weak.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Against this backdrop, this thesis asks: What are the challenges that currently affect 
civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone? The thesis seeks to identify the current 
problems of democratic civilian control of the military and determine the implications 
associated with these challenges in relation to the armed forces’ intervention in politics. 
The objective of this research is to assess the existing civilian control over Sierra Leone’s 
armed forces and identify gaps in civilian control that could prompt the military’s 
involvement into politics. For the purpose of this thesis, civilian control refers to direction 
and oversight of the armed forces by the executive, legislative, and judiciary.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The democratic consolidation efforts of Sierra Leone after its eleven-year civil war 
and the recent past of the military’s involvement in disrupting civilian governance makes 
civilian control of the armed forces crucial, which underscores the importance of this thesis. 
The study seeks to capture the interest of three groups—Sierra Leone defense 
policymakers, policymakers and consultants in other African countries, and scholars of 
civil-military relations. First, it intends to provide policy guidance and a roadmap to Sierra 
Leone’s defense policymakers on how effective civilian control could be achieved, which 
 
6 Ashlee Godwin and Cathy Haenlein, “Security-Sector Reform in Sierra Leone: The UK Assistance 
Mission in Transition,” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 6 (December 2013): 31, https://doi.org/10.1080/
03071847.2013.869721. 
3 
is critical to democratic consolidation by keeping the military apolitical and averting any 
form of military intervention in politics. Given its internal security challenges, Sierra Leone 
must continue to democratize civil-military relations and ultimately ensure that the military 
remains subordinated to civilian authority.  
Second, the study is useful to African policymakers engaged in similar reforms—
particularly those in the West African sub-region, which has been most prone to military 
coups in the continent.7 Military interventions in politics across African countries often 
stem from an executive dominance that thrives where state institutions are ineffective, 
patrimonial, and lack autonomy—much of which are legacies of European colonialism.8 
Many African nations sustain their fragile democracies by devising various strategies to 
dissuade the military from intervening in politics, which is among the main objectives of 
civilian control of the armed forces. The study hopes to provide an understanding of the 
type, approach, and level of civilian control that is required by African nations to ensure 
the existence of a healthy partnership between the armed forces and their civilian 
authorities with a view to sustaining their developing democracies. The study also speaks 
to debates about the significance of the military’s autonomy in state democratic 
consolidation.  
Third, this study contributes to the existing literature of civil-military relations in 
Africa and beyond. It provides insights into the relationship between the military and the 
civilian political elites in the region and provokes thoughts about their applicability in the 
young democracies of other parts of the world.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is limited scholarship on civilian control that particularly relates to Sierra 
Leone, but the existing rich literature of civil-military relations in general, and on Africa 
 
7 Ebere Onwudiwe, “Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research,” in The Military and 
Politics in Africa: From Intervention to Democratic Control, Contemporary Perspectives on Developing 
Societies (Aldershot, Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 18. 
8 Michael Bratton, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 62. 
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in particular, helps to explain some of the key concepts of this study. Civilian control of 
the armed forces is a crucial endeavor undertaken by most developing democracies in the 
overall democratic consolidation process, especially those that have experienced past 
military interventions in politics. This literature reviews analyzes five key themes that 
could help to provide answers to the main research question of the study. The review begins 
with the aspect of military professionalism as an enhancer of the acceptance of civilian 
supremacy by the military. The second, third, and fourth themes explore the challenges 
posed by high military prerogatives, lack of civilian expertise, and coup-proofing, 
respectively, on democratic civilian control. Finally, the fifth theme centers on some key 
debates surrounding institutionalizing democratic civilian control.  
1. On Military Professionalism and Its Connection to Civilian Control 
There is a body of literature that links political neutrality of the armed forces to 
democratic civilian control. This group of scholars argues that political neutrality is 
achieved through maintaining a professional military. In his book, The Soldier and the 
State, Samuel P. Huntington argues that military professionalism is the pathway to civilian 
control as both aspects reinforce each other in a democracy.9 With a focus on the officer 
corps, he describes military professionalism on the basis of three attributes of a specialized, 
distinguished vocation in terms of “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”10 He 
explains that the expertise makes the military a specialized body that is bestowed with state 
responsibility in the area of violence management.11 Huntington further notes that military 
professionalization comes through a systematic process of training and education in terms 
of skills, knowledge, and behavior that compels the uniformed men to adhere to strict 
professional ethics and norms.12 He also points out that military professionalism has a 
direct nexus with an apolitical military, which is the end state of objective civilian 
 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 7. 
10 Huntington, 11–16. 
11 Huntington, 11–16. 
12 Huntington, 11–18. 
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control.13 He views objective civilian control to be conducive for democratic nations as it 
ensures clear separation of roles between the civilian elites and the military. This type of 
control gives clear demarcation and autonomy to the military by enabling it to focus on its 
area of specialization and maximize professionalism while the civilians refrain from 
interfering in the affairs of the military.14 Objective control, according to Huntington, 
automatically prevents the military from intervening in politics and promotes the military’s 
subordination to civilian authority and control.15 Richard H. Kohn shares a similar view, 
as he argues that the military must demonstrate unwavering loyalty to civilian authority, 
which is crucial to their professional responsibility: 
civilian control requires a military establishment dedicated to political 
neutrality: one that shuns under all circumstances any interference with the 
constitutional functioning or legitimate process of government, that 
identifies itself as the embodiment of the people and the nation (and not a 
particular party, agenda, or ideology), and that counts unhesitating loyalty 
to lawful authorities and the system of government as crucial aspects of its 
professionalism.16  
Yet, Kohn contradicts Huntington’s view that military autonomy leads to civilian 
control. He argues that as the military gains autonomy and is barred from politics, the 
civilian elites equally lose control of the armed forces as each group remains focused on 
its own affairs, which in turn invites military intervention in politics.17 Morris Janowitz 
shares Huntington’s concept of professionalism, even if he disagrees that professionalism 
ensures military autonomy. In his 1971 book The Professional Soldier, Janowitz proposes 
a convergence theory between the military and civilian groups, and a new type of 
military—the so-called constabulary force—demanded by the changing security 
environment and society. He posits that socializing and upholding of the existing values of 
 
13 Huntington, 82–83. 
14 Huntington, 83. 
15 Huntington, 83. 
16 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military.(Civil-Military Relations),” Journal of 
Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 146, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1997.0060. 
17 Kohn, 143. 
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society by the professional military helps to enhance civilian control of the armed forces.18 
But, like Kohn, Janowitz also posits that these developments inevitably increase the 
political role of the military, which in turn limits its autonomy.19 
The advocates of this concept of professionalism have received many criticisms. In 
his 1996 article “The Civil-Military Problematique,” Peter D. Feaver observes that 
Huntington’s and Janowitz’s claims about military professionalism remain more 
theoretical than realistic in today’s circumstances.20 He holds this view because the 
military’s turning against the civilian authorities may still occur even in democracies where 
professionalism is relatively high.21 Samuel E. Finer in The Man on The Horseback: The 
Role of the Military in Politics also argues that military professionalism is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for political neutrality, as in the case of Germany and 
Japan in the 1930s.22 Thus, he notes that a professional military does collide with the 
civilian authorities.23 He explains that the “military’s consciousness of themselves as a 
profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than the 
government in power.”24 This view implies that the military leadership could regard 
themselves as powerful and independent and refuse to be subjected to checks, hence 
disposing them to become a threat to civilian administrations. He argues that the military 
will stay away from politics and remain under civilian control when the military becomes 
professional and accepts the principle of civilian supremacy.25 Since the goal of civilian 
control is the subordination of the military, the need for a civilian-led institution therefore 
 
18 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 
1971), 420. 
19 Janowitz, 3. 
20 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (January 1, 1996): 150, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0095327X9602300203. 
21 Feaver, 164. 
22 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 2002), 25. 
23 Finer, 25. 
24 Finer, 25. 
25 Finer, 25. 
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becomes crucial to demonstrating authority over the armed forces.26 This development, in 
turn, requires a military with a low degree of prerogatives and civilian defense expertise, 
both of which are the focus of the next themes of this literature.  
2. Challenges to Civilian Control: High Military Prerogatives 
Several scholars argue that military prerogatives pose a threat to civilian control. In 
his Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Alfred Stepan examines 
the dangers of military institutional prerogatives, which he describes as the circumstances 
where the military becomes powerful and politically influential enough to manage its 
institutional affairs as well as intervene in political decision-making. He explains that such 
conditions have deleterious effects on civilian control because they give the military a 
feeling of being indispensable and having a role in state governance.27 Stepan argues that 
minimizing these prerogatives would pave the path for democratic civilian control.28 
Civilians can also exert greater control over the armed forces by reducing military 
prerogatives and autonomy.29 Narcís Serra agrees and further contends that the gradual 
reduction of military autonomy enhances democratic civilian control and is vital for 
democratic consolidation. He cites Felipe Agüero’s delineation of two situations when the 
military can pose challenges to civilian control: when the armed forces control and 
manipulate political decision-making, and when they make it complicated for the civilians 
to establish control over them.30 In expressing this view, Serra illustrates seven stages of 
 
26 Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative 
Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 5, https://doi.org/10.5149/
9780807877036_trinkunas. 
27 Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 68, 94–97. Stepan identifies eleven military prerogatives that, once 
minimized, could enhance democratic civilian control: constitutionally sanctioned role, relationship to the 
chief executive, coordination of the defense sector, military participation in cabinet, legislature’s role in 
military affairs, role of civil servants and political appointees, intelligence collection roles, policing roles, 
role in promotions, state enterprise roles, and role in the legal system. 
28 Stepan, 93. 
29 Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge, UK : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47. 
30 Serra, 47. 
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reducing military autonomy to facilitate democratic civilian control.31 In sum, scholars 
equate reducing the military prerogatives after democratic transition to civilian control.  
In addition, having clear definitions of the role(s) of the armed forces are also 
important for civilian control. Paul Shemella suggests countries should be clear on the roles 
and functions of their military; these roles and missions should be clearly defined and 
legislated to ensure a fair and balanced utilization that could avert ambiguity and problems 
of control.32 This clarity and legislation becomes more important where the military is 
either utilized unilaterally or integrated with other security agencies on the execution of 
internal security roles, which differs from its traditional role of external defense. Shemella 
points out that failure to make clear distinctions on the security roles or the circumstances 
during which security institutions should integrate for internal security leads to “military 
and political failure”33 and impacts civilian control. Serra also cautions that “[a]rmies who 
think they foster permanent values are a real danger to democracy.”34 Similarly, Finer 
warns that involving the military in too many activities in the country, especially in internal 
security issues, increases the military’s popularity and brings it closer to politics, which 
may be detrimental to any stage of democracy.35 This situation may become even more 
worrisome where the internal security roles that the military should be engaged in are not 
well-defined in the overall national legal instruments. In sum, the reduction of military 
prerogatives is crucial to the enhancement of democratic civilian control.  
 
31 Serra, 48. Serra’s seven stages of reducing military autonomy and gradual civilian control of the 
military include military control of political power; guardians of national essences; constraining of 
government policies, defending organizational and operational autonomy; formal, but partial, acceptance of 
civilian supremacy, retention of ideological control, and democratic civilian control of the armed forces. 
32 Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 
1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 122–23. 
33 Shemella, 124. 
34 Serra, The Military Transition, 58. 
35 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 75–80. 
9 
3. Challenges to Civilian Control: Civilian Interest in Defense Matters 
and Civilian Defense Expertise  
The next theme is civilian expertise, which is another challenge for civilian control. 
Most civil-military relations literature on civilian expertise emphasizes that civilian elites 
should have the required knowledge and experience to exercise authority and oversight 
over the armed forces.  
Several scholars argue that democratic civilian control requires civilian-led 
institutions for the effective control of the armed forces. Kohn argues that commanders-in-
chief of the armed forces often depend on the civilian elites who work in civilian-led 
ministries and departments of defense for the management and control of the military.36 
Civilian ministers of defense, according to Kohn, need the support of a well-structured 
civilian staff with the requisite knowledge and expertise in defense matters whom both the 
political masters and the military leadership will trust so as to ensure effective civilian 
control. Referring to the U.S. particular context, Kohn maintains that adequate defense 
expertise is required to enable the executive branch to carry out its functions and authority 
as enshrined in the constitution such as commanding the armed forces, declaring war, 
developing strategy, and administering enlistment, procurement of equipment, and 
determination of the defense budget.37 In such a system, the professional military will 
choose to follow professional ethics to only serve as advisers to the civilian authorities and 
not as advocates in defense decision-making or policy development.38 Friction could arise 
between the military and the civilians, however, when decisions do not match military 
missions, principles, resources, and procedures. For this reason, Kohn warns that if the 
civilian authorities lack the appropriate knowledge and experience to handle military 
affairs, challenges to civilian control could emerge even when responsibilities are clearly 
delineated as in stable democracies.39  
 
36 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military.(Civil-Military Relations),” 149. 
37 Kohn, 150. 
38 Kohn, 146. 
39 Kohn, 147. 
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Similarly, Thomas Bruneau emphasizes that, apart from just subordinating the 
military, there is the need for civilians to be knowledgeable enough in defense matters so 
as to have the armed forces execute the instructions of the civilians as they are told.40 
Agreeing with Bruneau, David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez in Soldiers, Politicians, 
and Civilians, contend that the civilians should endeavor to demonstrate authority by 
knowing how to carry out their defense roles and not relinquish them to the military 
leadership.41 Both authors state that the challenge does not only stop with the expertise but 
the structures to ensure those with the specific defense qualifications, training, and 
experience are recruited to lead and direct the nation’s defense policies.42 In this way, the 
military will develop confidence in its civilian leadership and allow this leadership to come 
up with policy direction; this ensures military subordination and civilian control. Pion-
Berlin comments that in the defense sectors of developing and non-democratic countries, 
in particular, staff with little or no defense knowledge get hired either on political grounds 
or with administrative qualifications and gain knowledge on the job through training and 
defense courses.43 While new in the job with little or no defense knowledge and 
experience, civilian staff may be more likely to deal only with administrative matters of 
the defense ministry and shift the more technical aspects of strategy defense development 
to the military leaders, according to Anthony Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony 
Foster.44 This shift of responsibility has serious implications for civilian control as the 
potential exists for the military to increase its interests.  
Cottey et al. further agree with authors who see the need for civilian expertise and 
note that civilian elites need to be fully knowledgeable on defense policies that are relevant 
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to the state, with a clear understanding of the available resources and the feasibility of their 
implementation.45 The authors maintain that in addition to the establishment of defense 
ministries, having a suitably qualified civilian staff to carry out detailed security analysis 
vis-a-vis the required force structure, budget in relation to military missions, and realistic 
assessments of the available resources versus the defense policies remains crucial.46 Kori 
Schake and Jim Mattis in Warriors and Citizens concur with this view and explain some 
challenges associated with lack of expertise. They argue that civilian political leaders with 
limited defense expertise and experience are unlikely to develop good strategies that could 
aid the military to conduct successful operations.47 They explain that inexperienced 
civilians may not be able to determine and are sometimes not willing to provide what the 
military needs to become victorious in battles; they may also be unable to comprehend the 
military’s virtues especially when those virtues conflict with civilian interests and values.48 
Such a situation has the potential to instigate friction between the civilians and the military 
leadership, which could subvert civilian control, especially where democracy has not 
firmly taken root.  
Nevertheless, several scholars note that notwithstanding their level of expertise in 
defense, civilians are the ultimate defense decision makers. In democracies, as Schake and 
Mattis assert, there is an acceptance that the decision to go to war rests with the political 
leaders who are liable to make mistakes; the business of the military is to execute the 
civilians’ orders,49 which means the need for contestation should not arise whether the 
decision favors the military or not. In Who Guards The Guardians and How?, Thomas C. 
Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr. contend that civilian expertise is also needed for 
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ensuring appropriate defense acquisitions.50 If the civilian authorities should be able to 
exercise their authority in terms of defense spending and determining defense policies 
related to military operations, they should be able to establish institutions that define “key 
elements of the domestic political system and the armed forces.”51 These institutions could 
lay out defined roles and responsibilities whose processes may limit the excesses of the 
uniformed men and women while also legitimizing the authority of the civilians over the 
armed forces.  
Similarly, scholars argue that expertise is not enough to secure democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces. These academics posit that lack of interest in defense matters 
by civilians can also hinder democratic civilian control. For example, Pion-Berlin views 
that civilian politicians in Latin American countries are disincentivized in acquiring 
defense knowledge because of the levels of subordination already achieved over the armed 
forces as well as the fact that those countries do not face eminent external threats.52 He 
further asserts, in response to Bruneau’s emphasis on civilian defense expertise as a 
necessity for civilian control, that, aside from Latin American countries facing few foreign 
threats, civilian politicians in those countries lack interest in defense education because it 
adds no political gain in terms of votes.53 In like manner, Bruneau agrees with Pion-Berlin 
and adds that this lack of interest by civilians results in little prioritization of defense 
investment.54 It is therefore revealing that this interest deficit adds to the problem of 
civilian defense expertise. Thus, Serra advances reasons for civilians’ lack of interest in 
defense matters to include uncertainty in post, few defense benefits, and absence of 
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political will by the leaders.55 To this end, Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas reiterate the 
point that civilians’ interest is diverted from defense by other more important and 
sometimes less expensive non-defense matters.56 They view that the costs involved in 
developing strategic defense policies are sometimes relatively higher, especially when the 
military does not pose any threat to the civilian administration.  
4. Challenges to Civilian Control: Coup-Proofing 
Several academic works examine how coup-proofing poses challenges to civilian 
control.57 Many authors including George Clay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, and Aurel 
Croissant, agree that government leaders who suspect high risks of coups adopt coup-
proofing measures as a strategy to limit the ability of the military to seize power. According 
to these authors, such measures may be helpful in protecting regimes but can render the 
military ineffective or increase rivalry as a result of counterbalancing among troops, both 
of which could pose challenges to civilian control. According to Croissant, effective coup-
proofing could avert military coups, but when not effective, it could actually increase risks 
and can be disastrous to the regime.58  
Some scholars highlight the role of defense pacts in coup-proofing. For example, 
in Military and Politics in Africa, Kieh and Agbese mention that African civilian leaders 
use defense pacts, which are bilateral agreements for the intervention of foreign militaries 
when required, to politically and constitutionally control their local militaries.59 In 
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highlighting some of the advantages of this strategy for developing countries, Kieh and 
Agbese argue that defense pacts help institute constitutionality and legitimize the 
relationship of the executive, legislative, and military.60 This strategy could be 
counterproductive, however, if there are no established institutional arrangements or if 
external guarantors (foreign militaries) deal with a local militia instead of the modern 
army.61 Moreover, most African leaders may only be concerned about the protection of 
their regimes and not worried about putting institutions in place. Though Kieh and Agbese 
affirm that some defense pacts, such as state-state, state-liberation movements, and state-
mercenary agreements, have been effective in protecting some governments from coups, 
mutinies, and mini-wars, they also contend that others have failed to restrict the military 
from intervening in politics, thereby resulting in the fall of some regimes or leading to loss 
of constitutional control.62  
Other scholars, including Kieh and Agbese, and Suddoth, posit that political leaders 
adopt various coup-proofing methods that include the creation of different but parallel 
forces to the military, segregation of the military, meddling with appointments in line with 
their (politicians’) interests, and the formation of presidential guards composed of 
personnel from an ethnic or regional background associated with the regime in power.63 
Thus, once a leader coup-proofs him/herself with a particular group of forces, these 
strategies may contribute to division among the military, which could result in rivalry 
between military services or units. This rivalry poses challenges for the democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces as a single entity as one unit will aim to serve the president 
rather than the state, potentially making that entity political.  
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5. On Achieving Democratic Civilian Control through 
Institutionalization 
There is a corpus of literature that discusses the relevance of institutionalization in 
the enhancement of democratic civilian control. According to Harold Trinkunas in Crafting 
Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela, institutionalization relates to the 
establishment of a set of rules, such as the development of successful strategies into 
institutions, that provide more authority to the civilian politicians to control the armed 
forces.64 He describes institutionalized civilian control in two forms: containment and 
oversight.65 In the former, institutions grant autonomy to the military with civilians having 
less involvement in military affairs; while in the latter, which he argues is crucial to 
democratic control, politicians determine policies and direct the activities of the armed 
forces through an institutionalized defense bureaucracy.66 In the same vein, Bruneau and 
Matei provide a comprehensive framework for democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces, which involves three sets of mechanisms: “institutional control, oversight, and 
professional norms.”67 They make this argument on the consideration of effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
Several authors submit to the important role of defense bureaucracies in the 
strengthening of civilian authority over the armed forces. First, executive branch 
institutions can promote democratic civilian control through rules and procedures 
associated with the ministries of defense and national security councils. Bruneau and 
Goetze highlight that a ministry of defense can control the military through the 
establishment of effective and efficient defense strategies that clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of both the civilian elected authorities and the military leadership while 
ensuring the authority of the civilians.68 Therefore, once such civilian authority is 
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achieved, democratic civilian control could be assured and may help to prevent the armed 
forces from intervening in politics. Serra agrees with Bruneau and Goetze and cites the 
relevance of creating a single ministry to handle defense matters.69 Bruneau, Florina 
Cristiana Matei, and Sak Sakoda note that the role of the National Security Council 
(NSC)—also in the executive branch—in promoting civilian control is to provide 
professional information and advice to the executive on national strategic defense matters 
for informed decision making as well as to serve as a bridge between the legislature and 
the executive.70  
Other scholars highlight the important role of the legislative branch in civilian 
control. Pion-Berlin and Martínez mention that in a democracy where separation of powers 
prevails, the legislature serves as the checks and balances over the executive to counter 
excesses such as misuse of the military for political advantage; it also limits the potential 
for military prerogatives, and guides the jurisdiction of the military, which falls within the 
constitution.71 Reducing the powers of the executive over the military may not only avert 
arbitrary use, but also deter discontent from political opponents as well as promote the 
society’s wider trust in the military. The consideration of using the military for the right 
purpose compels lawmakers to be clear in capturing defense matters both in the constitution 
and the associated national and institutional legal frameworks. As observed by Pion-Berlin 
and Martínez, the legal frameworks developed by parliament help to regulate the activities 
of the military, define its chain of authority, and establish the manner and purpose for 
utilizing the armed forces.72 They caution, however, that the success of these legal 
instruments in limiting the misuse of the military depends on how much the rule of law is 
respected and upheld. Jeanne Giraldo and Cristiana Matei both agree with this view and 
further note that legislative control over the military is carried out through oversight 
committees that provide guidance and policy direction on defense budgets, the economy, 
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and the education of the military, thereby establishing a balance in control of the armed 
forces between the executive and the legislative branches in a democracy.73 
Similarly, some scholars emphasize the importance of judicial control over the 
armed forces as another key mechanism to sustainable civilian control. In democratic 
civilian control, Serra states that military justice is integrated in the judiciary as a unitary 
system that complements the other branches of government (executive and legislative) in 
the control of the military.74 In the same vein, Bruneau and Matei point out that the defense 
laws are interpreted by the judiciary and enshrined in the national constitutions; these laws 
help to thwart the military’s legacy of predominance, as the authors cited was the case of 
Argentina during its democratic transition in the early 1980s to 1990s.75 These legal 
instruments define the roles, responsibilities, do’s and don’ts of the armed forces, the 
limitations of the executive, and the authority for civilian control over the military. Matei 
and Halladay share similar thoughts in their unpublished study—The Control-Effectiveness 
Framework of Civil-Military Relations—in which they acknowledge the oversight function 
of the judiciary with the national legal instruments helping to shape the ideals of institutions 
and the development of policies.76  
Finally, other scholars argue that when formal oversight mechanisms fail, other 
oversight mechanisms outside of government such as the civil society and the media help 
boost civilian control of the armed forces. Feaver suggests the media as another important 
control agent of the armed forces as it brings to the attention of the civilian authorities any 
wrong-doings or excesses of the military during peacetime, but cautions about the media’s 
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role in war time because of the associated consequences.77 On the other hand, Kohn adds 
that for countries to realize effective civilian control, the media—which reflects public 
opinion—and the civilian society should be able to encourage opposition to military action 
that is contrary to the national interest through established institutions such as the 
judiciary.78 In his thesis on the role of civil society in shaping democratic civil-military 
relations in Nepal, Bhuwan Purna Satyal mentions that civil society pressure acts in some 
ways to reverse coups or bring military coupists to the negotiating table.79 This is an 
important factor that could limit the unconstitutional actions of the armed forces.  
6. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review and conditions prevalent in Sierra Leone, I propose 
four key hypotheses that relate to 1) military prerogatives; 2) military roles and missions; 
3) the political context and partial acceptance of civilian supremacy; and 4) lack of civilian 
defense expertise or interest. The hypotheses serve as potential explanations for Sierra 
Leone’s weaknesses in democratic civilian control. The thesis does not consider coup-
proofing as a potential hypothesis because the current arrangement of the presidential guard 
system has an established process of vetting individuals selected, who are drawn from all 
three branches of the services which suggests coup-proofing is not likely to be a major 
challenge to civilian control in Sierra Leone at present. 
First, I hypothesize that continued military prerogativesespecially the military’s 
control and coordination of aspects of the defense sector, and the military’s role in 
promotionsremain high. This high level of discretion helps to maintain military 
autonomy and, in turn, weakens democratic civilian control.  
Second, I posit that the increased involvement of the Republic of Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces in many domestic security roles and missions, which differ from external 
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defense roles and are not clearly legislated in the national legal instruments, will lead to 
weak civilian control. This result could occur because the involvement of the military in 
internal security roles, particularly in policing functions in the country, could make the 
military more popular and autonomous and give it a feeling of being powerful and 
indispensable in the state’s governance. This situation arises, for example, where the police 
lack the capacity and trust to effectively handle internal security matters. In such 
circumstances, with the military engaged in policing or other internal roles, the military’s 
political influence will increase and enable it to manipulate political decisions in its favor 
or interest. This high political influence and power will make it difficult for the civilians to 
assert their authority and control over the armed forces.  
The third hypothesis is that the politicization of the military by Sierra Leone 
politicians results in the partial acceptance of civilian supremacy by the armed forces, 
which leads to weak civilian control. The partial acceptance of civilian supremacy could 
result when politicians use the military to try to protect their regimes and, in return, grant 
the military favors. Politicization of the military can be especially problematic where the 
military’s professionalism is just gaining ground. This situation will pose a challenge to 
civilian control because of the low legitimacy of the regime, and the military could use this 
weakness to contest political decisions not in its favor or intervene in politics when the 
regime in power is not in its interest. These dynamics threaten civilian control because of 
the increased incentives for the military to intervene in politics.  
The fourth hypothesis is that the lack of civilian interest or expertise in defense 
matters leads to weak civilian control in Sierra Leone. Lack of civilian defense expertise 
and interest hinders policymakers’ ability to conduct oversight (for example, ask the right 
questions) or to develop strategic and defense policies. This result occurs in every 
democracy, but is more challenging in emerging or consolidating democracies where other 
democratic institutions are weak or not established. The military will be more willing to 
execute civilian strategic directions when they are clear and based on expertise. In the 
absence of this civilian expertise, the military can take over the task of strategic policy 
20 
development, thereby increasing the military’s power and influence and weakening civilian 
authority.80 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a single case study and process tracing methods to investigate the 
research question.81 The focus of the study is on Sierra Leone, but results could be 
generalized to some African countries with similar conditions. Sierra Leone is a notable 
case study because of the country’s history of military interventions in politics, the role the 
last military regime played in the country’s democratization process, and the influence the 
military still has in the state’s governance. Sierra Leone also resembles other new 
democracies in Africa in that elections have become more competitive and there have been 
four successful electoral turnovers of power between the two main political parties in the 
country. 
The study focuses on four key aspects of Sierra Leone’s civil-military relations. 
First, the study investigates the military’s prerogatives that are connected to its relationship 
with the chief executive, defense coordination, and its role in promotions, and determine 
their impact on democratic civilian control. To investigate military prerogatives, I look at 
decision-making processes around key defense and security issues. I assess the extent to 
which military leaders and civilians influence these decisions. 
Second, the thesis examines the new roles and missions of the military in relation 
to its involvement in domestic security. To assess this hypothesis, I examine the military’s 
degree of involvement in the conduct of policing and other internal roles and their 
implications for the behavior of the military as it relates to civilian control.  
Third, the thesis assesses the implications of civilian leaders politicizing the 
military to gain advantage over their opponents. The study examines the informal 
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relationship between civilian politicians and the military to identify whether there are any 
special favors given to a set of military personnel and any political manipulations in 
military promotions, appointments, deployments, and recruitment. Furthermore, the study 
determines the impacts of these manipulations on the control of the armed forces.  
Fourth, the thesis analyzes the problems posed by the limited civilian defense 
expertise at the Sierra Leone defense ministry (MOD) and assesses the impact of such 
conditions, if any, on control of the Sierra Leone armed forces. The study examines the 
qualification requirements for employment as civilian staff at the Sierra Leone MOD, the 
development procedures of strategic defense policies and their implementation, the role of 
the legislature and judiciary in serving as checks and balances for the executive’s use of 
the military, and the national legal instruments that provide the civilian authority over the 
armed forces. The study analyzes the findings and determines their impact on prospects for 
democratic civilian control.  
This thesis utilizes information mainly from scholarly books, journals, and 
academic articles as well as national documents such as the country’s constitution and the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) Act. The constitution and the RSLAF 
Act help to present the legal instruments related to the armed forces in Sierra Leone. 
Additionally, relevant media publications provide information on the military’s 
involvement in the conduct of domestic security roles.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters. The introductory chapter has provided a brief 
historical background of the military’s intervention in politics, established the research 
question on the challenges to civilian control of the military and its significance, reviewed 
the existing literature, and outlined hypotheses. Chapter II covers the country’s civil-
military relations development process from 1996 to present. The chapter also outlines the 
military’s external defense roles and contemporary domestic security roles and missions in 
line with their lawfulness. It also features the various roles and responsibilities of the three 
branches of government and their relationship with the defense bureaucracy. Chapter III 
analyzes the empirical evidence of the challenges facing civilian control of the military 
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from 1996 to the present, after the return of democracy, and evaluates their implications 
for the consolidation of democracy in Sierra Leone. The third chapter also investigates the 
evidence for each hypothesis. Finally, Chapter IV concludes the thesis, summarizing the 
findings of the study and making feasible recommendations that may be of significance to 




II. THE DYNAMICS OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS 
IN SIERRA LEONE (1996–2020) 
Like many West African countries, between the periods of decolonization in 1961 
and the third wave of democratization in the 1990s, Sierra Leone’s civil-military relations 
were characterized by high military politicization resulting in several military coups and 
counter coups.82 In other words, the uniformed men who were charged with protecting 
their citizens became a threat to both the state of Sierra Leone and the people.83 The armed 
forces at that time saw themselves as an arbitrator in the political affairs of the state, 
especially as the 1978 constitution and the Military Forces Act of 1961 designated the 
military as the “guardian of the constitution and the guarantor of national independence 
and territorial integrity.”84 Nevertheless, despite attempts by civilians to prevent a full 
takeover of government by co-opting the military, the armed forces remained a threat to 
the civilian administrations from 1967 until 1996, when democracy was ushered in by the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military regime that had taken over power in 
1992.85 The subsequent subsections elaborate on the NPRC regime.  
This chapter focuses on the relationship between the civilian politicians and the 
military to better understand patterns of civil-military relations in Sierra Leone since its 
democratic transition in 1996 to the present. The chapter starts with a brief reflection on 
the postcolonial era before democratization, and then proceeds to examine the 2002 
democratic institutional reformation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, 
civilian-led institutions, and the main branches of government. The chapter further explores 
the non-traditional roles and missions of the military in comparison to its traditional 
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defense functions, and the relationship of the main branches of government and the military 
in terms of democratic civilian oversight. Finally, the chapter examines the role of civil 
society and the media in ensuring democratic civilian control of the armed forces in the 
country.  
A. THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES AND POLITICS PRIOR TO 
DEMOCRATIZATION (1967–1996) 
Following the attainment of independence in 1961, Sierra Leone inherited a 
traditional colonial force—small in size and capacity—limited mostly to regimental duties 
and defense of political regimes.86 Since the early period of post-independence, the civilian 
rulers used the military leadership to protect their regimes and intimidate political 
opponents, which increased military involvement in politics and ultimately undermined the 
armed forces’ professionalism.87  
The first major political action of the military occurred in the midst of the stalemate 
of the 1967 election, when, on March 21, the force commander Brigadier David Lansana 
took over government following a standoff between the two main contesting political 
parties—the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the All People’s Congress (APC). 
The military takeover prevented the APC, which was declared winner of the elections, from 
taking office.88 This intervention marked the first military coup in Sierra Leone and the 
beginning of the Sierra Leone armed forces’ praetorianism. The coup leader, a southerner, 
was linked to the SLPP, which had its stronghold in the south; hence, some observers 
viewed his action as partisan.89 This observation was evidenced by the gathering of SLPP 
supporters in the coup leader’s house, which Thomas Cox mentions as “prima facie 
evidence.”90 Therefore, the 1967 military coup revealed the underlying ethnicization, 
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regionalism, and loyalty of the military leadership to the ruling party, and hence, set the 
stage for subsequent coups in the country.91  
Two counter-coups followed Lansana’s 1967 military intervention. The first took 
place just two days later, on March 23, 1967, led by Majors Blake and Jumu, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Juxon-Smith, who formed the National Reformation Council military regime. 
These military coupists were earlier supporters of General Lansana and shared his 
objectives of the earlier coup, but overthrew him because they disliked the then SLPP 
leader, Prime Minister Albert Margai, to whom they suspected Lansana would hand over 
power.92 In 1968, barely a year later, the second counter-coup was executed by enlisted 
soldiers who were led by two warrant officers believed to hail from the north.93 
Immediately, the coupists handed over government to the earlier declared winner of the 
1967 elections—the APC—marking a return to civilian administration with Siaka Stevens 
as the Prime Minister.94 He ruled from 1968 to 1985. Hence, the involvement of the 
military in determining which political party was in governance of the state indicates the 
military’s high level of politicization at the time.  
The seventeen years of the Stevens administration were marked by increased 
military politicization and a personalistic authoritarian rule, with the country evolving to a 
republican and presidential system of governance in 1971, and later in 1978, turning into a 
one-party state.95 Mindful of the military’s threat of staging coups, the Stevens 
administration adopted a policy to neutralize this threat by increasing the number of its 
regional northern officers, and purging suspected opposing and disloyal southerners.96 
Nevertheless, this strategy, which was meant to establish control of the armed forces and 
protect the regime, failed to work for the administration as two other coup attempts and an 
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attempted presidential assassination occurred in the mid-1970s.97 Some of the soldiers and 
civilians involved in the coup attempts were prosecuted and those found guilty executed 
by the Stevens administration to send a stern warning to others.98 The civilians involved 
were allegedly dissident members of the United Democratic Party—the third registered 
party in Sierra Leone at the time—and opposed to Stevens’ policies and governance. 
In devising further methods of control and mitigation of the threat of the military, 
Stevens introduced what Mac Dixon-Fyle calls “dyarchy”—a measure of having limited 
incorporation of the military leadership into the political system in order to simultaneously 
address the interests of both the civilian authorities and the military.99 Thus, the force 
commander, Brigadier General Joseph Momoh, who was a northerner and shared the same 
ethnicity with the president, was appointed as a member of parliament alongside his police 
counterpart; Momoh was given a ministerial post in 1974.100 In addition to this dyarchy 
approach, the Stevens administration adopted a coup-proofing strategy with the signing of 
a defense pact with neighboring Guinea, and also established an Internal Security Unit, 
which was later dubbed the Special Security Division (SSD), a paramilitary force to protect 
the regime and key government offices. The SSD, which has now been transformed into 
the Operational Security Division under the Sierra Leone Police, was highly privileged and 
even equaled the regular army in terms of utilization by government; this was much to the 
annoyance of the Sierra Leone military.101 
By 1985, high levels of corruption within the Stevens administration and increased 
inflation seriously degraded the country’s economy, leading to soaring unemployment and 
high cost of living.102 This increased corruption had a direct nexus with the heightened 
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inflation in the country.103 Under this situation, President Stevens retired in 1985, and 
appointed the force commander—General Joseph Momoh—to succeed him; this 
appointment was approved through a national referendum with Momoh as the only 
candidate.104 Thus, the military-turned civilian president inherited an administration that 
was confronted not only with a battered national economy and a frustrated populace, but 
also weak, ill-equipped, and politically divided armed forces. The military’s weakness and 
low level of professionalism were manifested in its poor handling of the civil war, which 
was launched by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in March 1991.105 The war 
ravaged the country to a great extent.106 The general populace and the military blamed 
President Momoh for his inability to repel the RUF rebels. In April 1992, the country saw 
yet another successful military coup staged by junior military officers from the war front, 
who overthrew the Momoh administration and formed the National Provisional Ruling 
Council military regime.107 After five years of military rule, the NPRC handed over power 
to Tejan Kabba, who won the 1996 presidential elections, bringing a dawn to democracy 
in the country.108 With this democratic change, Sierra Leone hoped for national stability 
and democratic control of its military. 
In sum, from the period of Sierra Leone gaining its sovereignty in 1961 to the mid-
1990s, the relationship between the Sierra Leone armed forces and the politicians was at 
times contentious as politicians battled to keep the armed forces from intervening in 
politics, and prevent them from overthrowing their governments. Civilians used various 
strategies to exert control over the armed forces, including ethno-regional stacking, co-
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optation, and coup-proofing. Nonetheless, the military continued to pose a threat to the 
regime up through the mid-1990s. The lack of civilian-led institutions, like a MOD led by 
civilians and a framework of oversight of the military by main branches of government 
other than the executive, such as the legislature and judiciary, laid the foundation for future 
weaknesses in civilian control of the armed forces.  
B. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
After 1998, when the Kabbah administration returned to power following its 
overthrow by a coalition of some RUF and military elements in 1997 and its subsequent 
exile in neighboring Guinea, the attention of the administration turned to reforming the 
security sector and particularly the military and the police. This reform emerged as a result 
of the military’s continued threat to the civilian administration and its poor performance in 
the country’s eleven-year civil war. This section describes the key reforms and 
transformation processes in the security sector after the end of the country’s eleven-year 
civil war in 2002, with a focus on reforming the military after the civil war while 
reestablishing national stability and ensuring democratic governance.  
Post-war consolidation of state governance and efforts to establish civilian 
authority guided the signing of a ten-year peacebuilding memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in 2002 between the Kabbah administration and the government of the United 
Kingdom.109 The strategic goal of the MOU was to help build a trustworthy relationship 
between the government of Sierra Leone and the post-war fragmented Sierra Leone 
military, while establishing a democratic system of governance. Thus, the government 
initiated a security sector reform program in 2002 aimed at restructuring and transforming 
the military under the framework of democratic civilian control, which is a replica of the 
British dual civil-military partnership, while at the same time reshaping the other security 
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agencies such as the police and the civilian intelligence cell.110 This defense reform was 
premised on the consideration that a professional and accountable military is a precursor 
to the broader advancement of democratic institutions.111  
The reform included two key parts: military transformation and overhauling of 
civilian-led institutions. Each reform component is discussed in turn in the next sections. 
1. Restructuring and Transforming the Military 
The first part of the defense reform included restructuring and retraining the armed 
forces with the integration of the ex-combatants of the warring factions of the eleven-year 
civil war. The integration of the ex-fighters, who met the set criteria, into the reform was 
part of the United Nations peacekeeping force-led disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration program (DDR) in the country. This DDR program was among the activities 
implemented by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to end the war, 
and bring peace and stability in the country.112 Thus, the defense reform paved the way 
for the professionalization of the military and establishment of structures for democratic 
civilian control.  
Professionalizing the Sierra Leone armed forces was tied to a five-year framework 
that began in 1999 with a refresher training run by the British-led International Military 
Assistant Training Team (IMATT). It mentored the RSLAF on leadership roles, and taught 
them to adopt an attitude of refraining from politics and focusing on the institution’s 
primary mandate of external defense, with the police having primacy on internal 
security.113 This transformation followed the UK’s military model in terms of the British 
military’s relationship with its politicians. These professionalization efforts led to the 
establishment of a military college—Horton Academy—where command and staff training 
was taught to improve the knowledge base of the military. Part of the reform process was 
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also ensuring a manageable force size in terms of both quality and resources. The military 
was downsized from its postwar size of 15,000 to its current strength of a little less than 
9,000; and its name changed to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) while 
other aspects of infrastructure and military equipment were addressed.114 In further 
professionalizing the military, the reform effort also addressed areas of military recruitment 
and transparency.  
In the area of recruitment, a set of standards was established by the IMATT based 
on educational qualification, fitness, ethical norms, and good conduct, and required that 
candidates be Sierra Leonean nationals. These criteria were set to remove the influence of 
ethno-regionalism, which was viewed as a key driver of the military’s involvement in 
politics. With regard to the educational qualification, potential candidates were required to 
have at least three credits in the Basic Education and Certificate Examinations (BECE), 
and those opting to become officers were required to have at least five credits in areas 
including Mathematics and English at the West African School Certificate Examinations 
(WASCE). These recruitment standards and training processes are still in place and 
followed today.  
The reform has improved the level of the military’s standard of training and 
transparency within the institution. During the restructuring, trainings for officer 
candidates and other ranks were changed to last six to twelve months during which 
professional skills and ethics were developed; this training process has remained to date. 
At present, on completion of training, personnel are assigned to their respective service 
arms—army, navy, and air force—based on the trainers’ determination, individual 
interests, and/or qualification, especially for those with trade, technical expertise, and 
university degrees. The ethics and specialization of the personnel develop over time during 
a period of one or two months of follow-on training received at the service arm to which 
the individuals get assigned after initial training. Today, the Sierra Leone military upholds 
and follows these standards of recruitment and training.  
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Additionally, on top of the improved recruitment standards and increased training 
levels introduced by the reform, there has been increased transparency in the activities of 
the military, including promotions, recruitment, and financial accountability, through the 
creation of a defense website (www.mod.sl) and defense news magazine.115 Some military 
issues including the mentioned areas are now published for public consumption; for 
example, the current 2020 recruitment was advertised and the progress of that process 
regularly published on the website. Also, there has been improvement in meeting some of 
the material needs of the RSLAF such as housing, conditions of living and salary structure, 
and deployment. Some structures for the management and administration of the military, 
such as the civilian-led MOD (which is elaborated on in the subsequent section), and the 
Armed Forces Personnel Center (AFPC), which is responsible for the career management 
of personnel in the RSLAF, have been established through the reform process.116  
Furthermore, the reform redefined RSLAF’s roles and missions—to include non-
traditional tasks—in addition to its traditional external defense roles. Section 165 (1) of the 
country’s 1991 constitution spells out the traditional function of the armed forces: to 
“protect and secure the country, preserve its safety and territorial integrity, and take part in 
its development; it is responsible for protecting the people’s achievement and the 
constitution.”117 Thus, the main external defense roles and missions of the RSLAF focus 
on territorial defense, which aim at protecting the state from foreign aggression and 
contributing to regional and international peace and stability through peace support 
operations. These external defense tasks focus on securing the borders between Sierra 
Leone and its immediate neighbors—Liberia and Guinea—in the three domains of land, 
sea, and air. Today, in addition to these external defense functions, however, the reform 
program has led to the RSLAF performing domestic security tasks in support of the Sierra 
Leone Police. Some of these tasks include participating in response to disaster and 
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pandemics, quelling civil riots and street violence, fighting organized crime, securing 
elections and transporting election materials, providing prison security, enforcing maritime 
law at sea, and ensuring the security of very important state functions such as the opening 
of parliament and presidential inaugurations. The military also participates in the country’s 
nationwide monthly cleaning exercise, and helps coordinate and ensure that the citizens 
comply. These new roles and missions are broadly framed in the policy document called 
Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA), and enshrined in the country’s 2002 National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act (NASCIA 2002) and the 2003 defense white 
paper.118 The NASCIA and Defense White Paper inform Sierra Leoneans on the 
contemporary roles of the military in addition to its external defense role.119  
This MACA policy defines the non-traditional roles of the military and all those 
operations that require close cooperation and collaboration with civilian entities for civil 
protection. The policy is further subdivided into military aid to civil power (MACP), 
military aid to government departments (MAGD), and military aid to civil community 
(MACC). Nonetheless, the engagement of the military in any of these functions must be 
requested and authorized by the Office of National Security, which is responsible to the 
president. 
In sum, the restructuring and transformation portion of the reform helped to 
improve the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. This professional enhancement 
is demonstrated in the military’s participation in regional peace support operations and its 
successes in the performance of state security tasks. The RSLAF peacekeeping troops 
received praise for their performance in the joint UN-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) in 2009 and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2009.120 Also, in 
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2014, the RSLAF was instrumental in the fight against the Ebola epidemic, and continues 
to play a significant role in the current fight against the corona virus (COVID 19) 
pandemic.121 Furthermore, the newly restructured RSLAF was hailed by many observers 
for professionally complementing the police in successfully securing three successive 
national elections (2007, 2012, and 2018), two of which it covered when the large UN 
peacekeeping force left the country in 2005, and ensured the smooth transfer of power in 
all three elections.122 Though there were a few allegations of some military meddling, and 
isolated violence in the 2018 elections in the social media, local tabloids, and some 
international media like the New York Times, these allegations were not substantial enough 
to erode the general achievement of the armed forces in ensuring the successful conduct of 
the elections.123  
On the other hand, the five-year RSLAF reform and transformation process (1999–
2004) was too rushed to be fully effective. Military reforms require some considerable time 
to take effect, as emphasized by Bruneau and Matei, and especially in the circumstances of 
Sierra Leone’s military.124 This rushed reform effort in Sierra Leone can be linked to the 
government’s endeavors then to quickly unify the fragmented national force and establish 
stability for the furtherance of democratic governance after the war.125 This urgent fix 
could be the reason for the government’s action to integrate the UN-led DDR program in 
the defense reform process as part of the postwar peace settlement and stabilization 
efforts.126 
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2. Reformation of Civilian-Led Institutions  
The second part of the reform program involved the establishment and structural 
modification of the civilian-led institutions to foster democratic civilian control. The 
process included the transformation of a previously military-led and dominated defense 
ministry to a civilian-led institution that now oversees the newly restructured RSLAF, the 
development of a national defense policy, and the establishment of a National Security 
Council.127 The reform also established a civilian-led intelligence and national policy 
coordinating body—the office of national security—which is now responsible for 
coordinating all security matters in the country with the informed decision of the 
president.128 The new MOD, now headed by a civilian minister and his deputy, operates 
in a joint partnership between the civilian authorities and the senior military leadership. 
Within the framework of democratic governance, the MOD civilian leadership is 
responsible for defense acquisition and procurement, management and accounting of 
finances, administration, and policy direction of all defense matters.129  
Currently, the professional sector of the civilian administration is headed by a 
Director General (DG) whose position is equivalent to a permanent secretary, and is equal 
to the Chief of Defense Staff of the armed forces (head of the armed forces). The civilian 
administration comprises two broad directorates including Finance and Administration, 
and Policy and Procurement. Each of these directorates is headed by a deputy secretary 
who serves as direct assistant to the DG. Many of the civilian staff at MOD are recruited 
through the government’s public service commission and are periodically rotated within 
the respective ministries, departments, and agencies (MDA) in the country. This 
employment process implies that many of these civilian staff members are political 
appointees, while the few career employees are recruited not necessarily with defense 
qualifications and expertise, but rather administrative credentials. This process has serious 
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implications for the expertise and knowledge to carry out strategic defense roles such as 
defense acquisition and procurement, structuring the military, and policy direction. 
Since the civilian-military partnership is yet a new concept at MOD, the IMATT, 
now transformed into the International Security and Assistance Team (ISAT) and still led 
by the British, continues to play a mentoring role to both the military and civilian staff in 
order to enhance its knowledge and expertise. Moreover, ISAT conducts short term training 
and education to strengthen the skills and confidence of the MOD staff to carry out their 
functions in the ministry. The training and education of civilian staff remains a continuing 
process because of the periodic rotation and the arrival of new staff from other MDAs who 
replace prior staff. Thus, newly assigned or employed staff will always require training to 
adjust to their new defense jobs at MOD. In fact, to continue its mentoring and supervising 
role, the ISAT maintains a UK–MOD employee who serves as civilian adviser to the 
defense ministry. Thus, the continued UK advisory role indicates the shallow level of 
civilian defense expertise at MOD, which could be responsible for the delay on the part of 
the civilian defense leadership to develop the national security strategy from which the 
RSLAF could have framed its military strategy. Hence, the new civilian-led MOD has a 
critical role in influencing civilian control of the armed forces.  
The MOD serves as the bridge between the executive branch of government and 
the armed forces. This connection is enhanced through the Defense Council (DC), which 
was established by the country’s 1991 constitution and is chaired by the president.130 The 
DC comprises the president (commander-in-chief of the armed forces), the vice president, 
the ministers of defense and internal affairs, the MOD permanent secretary, the chief of 
defense staff (CDS), the chiefs of the three service arms, and two other persons appointed 
by the president.131 According to section 169 of the 1991 constitution, the “DC advises the 
president on all major matters of policy relating to defense and strategy including the role 
of the armed forces, military budgeting and finance, administration, and promotion of 
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officers above the rank of lieutenant or its equivalent.”132 It is further empowered in 
section 169 (3), with the consent of the president and commander-in-chief, to make 
regulations related to the control and tasking of the armed forces, conditions of service, 
command and appointments, and the delegation of authority to try military offenders. With 
the president being the chairman of the DC, the recommendations of this body usually align 
with his interests and are sanctioned by him.  
As a republican state, Sierra Leone’s constitution provides enormous powers of 
control of the armed forces to the president, who is the head of the executive and 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Equally, the other branches of government, 
including the parliament and judiciary, have considerable constitutional oversight powers 
but contesting decisions of the commander-in-chief over issues of the military is rarely 
visible or practical. The executive dominates control of the armed forces in terms of 
operational tasking and general administration. With regard to the parliament, it is 
responsible for the laws of Sierra Leone and any related legal instrument. It has 
constitutional powers for parliamentary oversight functions over the military and the 
general security sector, but practically—those that are related to finance—resource 
allocation and expenditures, remain more visible even after the limited capacity building 
by the reform.133  
In enhancing the parliament’s oversight role over the military, the reform program 
provided some capacity-building with the refurbishment of the parliament building and 
revitalization of the national security and defense committees.134 Today, the defense 
budget is approved by parliament, and its expenditures, including procurements and 
general utilization, are monitored by the defense committee through regular periodic 
auditing. Though the civilian leadership is responsible for the financial accounting to 
parliament, the CDS or his military leaders can be called for questioning if required, unlike 
prior to the reform. As a present norm, the defense committee does periodic checks on 
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defense expenditures and utilization of allocated money and material resources. This 
financial monitoring has increased accountability in the MOD. Furthermore, military 
promotions and appointments of very senior officers in the ranks of brigadier and above or 
its equivalent are ratified and approved by parliament upon receipt from the military 
through the executive chain. Nevertheless, promotions or appointments are rarely rejected 
by parliament, and the procedure is routinely observed. On the other hand, regular scrutiny 
of defense finances and expenditures remains visible and is made public as it is for all other 
government departments.  
Similarly, the oversight role of the judiciary over the armed forces is limited only 
to ensuring the RSLAF abides by the constitution and rules of the land, and conforms to 
international regulations, treaties, and norms signed and ratified by the country.135 The 
judiciary is responsible for interpreting the country’s laws and the administration of justice 
in the country. Like the legislature, the reform program was only able to refurbish the main 
court, and accomplished some training for judges and magistrates in order to enhance 
effective delivery of justice in the country.136 Nonetheless, revision of the national 
legislation to clearly include judicial democratic control of the armed forces has yet to be 
achieved. The military, however, is subject to both the military system of justice and the 
national judicial system, with the latter being supreme depending on the type of offense 
committed (civil or criminal). Military personnel who commit a criminal offense outside 
the realm of the RSLAF or are sued by a civilian in a civil matter can be tried in the civilian 
courts, and if found guilty will serve the punishment like any other civilian. On the other 
hand, civilians are not tried in military courts or tribunals. When there is a mix of civilians 
and military in the commission of, for example, treasonable offenses, which are among the 
most serious offenses in the country, civilians are separated and prosecuted in the High 
Courts of Sierra Leone, while the military personnel are subjected to court martial. 
The RSLAF justice system, which conforms to the country’s constitution, is guided 
by the Defense Act of 1961, as amended. It mainly focuses on military discipline, 
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professional conduct, and other related offenses. For serious offenses, the RSLAF utilizes 
the court martial system in line with section 84 of the RSLAF Act. In line with the Act, the 
convening of courts martial or military tribunals, is authorized by the force commander or 
his delegated authority and presided over by at least five military officers, as well as a 
civilian judge advocate who is appointed as a professional adviser. The responsibility for 
any ruling in a matter rests squarely on the officers of the jury, and not the judge advocate.  
In sum, apart from the few capacity-building efforts for both the parliament and 
judiciary, the 2002 reform program largely failed to fully integrate the two institutions, 
which are key for the oversight functions on the security sector including the military. 
Thus, the executive and particularly the president and commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces remain dominant in the control of the military in Sierra Leone.  
C. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 
Sierra Leone has a vibrant civil society that is largely supported by NGOs, and is 
geared towards monitoring the government for good governance.137 Through advocacy, 
civil societies and the Sierra Leone Association of Non-governmental Organizations 
(SLANGO) place pressure on the government to observe democratic principles and 
international best practices in dealing with the citizens. Similar pressure is placed on the 
Sierra Leone Police when abuse or ill-treatment of civilians is observed, but not as much 
with the armed forces.  
On the part of the media, the constitution provides for freedom of expression and 
the press. Hence, there are over twenty local print media companies, several broadcasting 
radio stations, four television stations, and web-based media outlets in the country.138 Most 
of these media outlets are critical about the government’s activities, state institutions, and 
the general politics in the country. By contrast, access to military information remains 
bureaucratic and procedural, which some media agencies are hardly able to contend with. 
Nonetheless, the defense reform resulted in the establishment of the public relations 
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directorate at MOD, which has helped pave some inroads for the public media to access 
military information, while the RSLAF also regularly publishes some of its activities. This 
access has enabled the public media to publish reports of military promotions, 
appointments, retirements, recruitment, professional misconduct, defense expenditures, or 
ill behavior of military personnel. The defense PR Directorate, however, always cautions 
the public media to ensure certain news about the military is cleared for correctness before 
publication.  
Despite these improvements, the oversight role of the media, civil society advocacy 
groups, and NGOs on the armed forces remains rather weak; this weakness could be a 
result of the non-inclusion of these organizations’ oversight role in the national legal 
framework like the constitution, or because it is yet a relatively new phenomenon for the 
country. The history of military coups, oppression of political opponents and dissidents, 
and beating and targeting of media personnel by the military could also be other reasons 
that civilian and military leaders exclude the media and civil society from military issues.  
In sum, the civil society and the media focus only on issues of the armed forces that 
affect the citizens’ civil liberties but hardly touch defense policies, nor do these public 
watchdogs attempt to push for a review or scrutiny of certain strategic decisions that may 
not be favorable to the military. Instead, the success stories of military operations, 
promotions, recruitment, and financial expenditures remain the media’s focal issues.  
D. CONCLUSION  
From the early post-independence period until 1996, when democracy was ushered 
in, Sierra Leone’s civil-military relations were largely focused on civilians exerting 
subjective control of the armed forces to protect political regimes. As described in this 
chapter, the RSLAF became highly politicized and posed a threat to the civilian 
administrations from 1967 into the late 1990s. The politicization of the military adversely 
affected its professionalism and effectiveness, resulting in its poor performance and 
fragmentation in prosecuting the eleven-year civil war. The end of the war brought about 
the 2002 defense reform, which was integral to the introduction of more stable governance 
and civilian control over the national armed forces. The reform helped to improve the 
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RSLAF’s professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy, while simultaneously 
improving on the military’s operational effectiveness to conduct internal security tasks 
alongside the police. In the process of accepting civilian supremacy, the reform has 
increased the military’s accountability through its civilian leadership at MOD which has 
improved the level of defense transparency.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION OF CIVILIAN 
CONTROL IN SIERRA LEONE 
Despite the postwar defense reform that the military and other associated relevant 
civilian-led institutions went through, there are still challenges with democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces. This chapter analyzes the challenges to democratic civilian 
control of the military based on the four hypotheses of this thesis: high military 
prerogatives, engagement of the military in new roles and missions, military politicization, 
and lack of civilian defense expertise. This chapter also investigates the reasons for the 
presence of these problems and their gravity, and how they undermine the consolidation of 
democracy in the country. These four assumptions are interconnected in their impact on 
the health of civil-military relations and particularly on democratic control of the military 
in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, this chapter finds that the military’s internal roles and 
missions and low levels of civilian expertise are currently the weaker dimensions of civilian 
control in the country. Each of the hypotheses is discussed in the following subsections.  
A. CHALLENGES FACING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL  
In this section, I investigate the four hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1: military 
prerogatives, roles and missions, politicization, and civilian expertise. The engagement of 
the military in domestic security and the low levels of civilian defense expertise indicate 
challenges to democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone. The other 
two hypotheses—high military prerogatives and military politicization—do not show 
immediate challenges, which is attributable to the country’s reform process, but could 
become problematic if the other two are not addressed.  
1. High Military Prerogatives  
The current situation in Sierra Leone shows that the military’s prerogatives are low 
and do not pose an immediate challenge to civilian control. One of the main reasons for 
this achievement is the civilian-military dual partnership introduced by the British-led 
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IMATT defense reform in 2002.139 The establishment of the civilian-led MOD has eroded 
the military’s dominance compared to the past, and hence, decreased its self-governance. 
As such, currently, the military does not have absolute discretion over the entire affairs of 
the institution. For example, the military presently receives direction and orders from the 
democratically appointed political leaders (the defense ministers and civilian staff at 
MOD), which contrasts with what prevailed in the past when the military dealt directly 
with the president to advocate for its interests.140 Also, the defense policy and operations 
committee (DPOC) at MOD formulates and implements operational policies. The DPOC, 
which comprises civilian staff and senior military officers, is headed by a civilian (the 
deputy defense secretary for policy). It is responsible for coordinating development of 
operational policies in partnership with the military leadership. DPOC directs all 
operational policies and makes the military apply its professional and technical knowledge 
to execute what the civilians direct. A specific example is the assignment of the military to 
work with other security agencies in the provision of security for the 2018 elections. The 
National Security Council (NSC), through the Office of National Security (ONS), directed 
and provided a security framework by which the security sector could ensure effective 
policing of the 2018 elections.141 With this framework, the civilian elites achieved 
considerable progress in reducing the military’s powers.  
The key driving force behind the reduction in the military’s prerogatives is the 
embedding of British military officers into the armed forces during the 2002−2004 
restructuring and transformation process. Working with the then political leadership of 
President Tejan Kabba, the UK military reformers had executive powers for resource 
allocation to the military, pay, retention of military officers with particular focus on the 
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senior cadre, and policy decision-making.142 The British reformers purged any military 
officers who were observed either by IMATT or political elites close to the president to 
resist the reforms. For instance, in implementing the controversial downsizing of the 
military from its immediate postwar number of 16,000 to 8,500 in 2002, eighty officers 
were removed from the military for allegations that they had conducted wartime abuses; 
this action was viewed by others to be connected to their resistance or non-cooperation 
with the British-led reforms.143 Even though some observers viewed several instances of 
purging to be a politically motivated way to remove hardline senior military officers who 
opposed the reforms and posed a threat to Kabba’s civilian administration, the IMATT 
took responsibility for the purging. IMATT did so provided that the interests of the Kabba 
administration for stable government as well as the reform’s main objective to establish 
control over the armed forces were achieved. Thus, the military leadership gradually 
became attuned to the new democratic framework through the mentoring of the embedded 
reformers, and hence, accepted civilian leadership and reduced prerogatives.  
On the intelligence side, the flow and reporting of security information and 
intelligence to the executive was led and dominated in the past by the military, but it is now 
centralized under the civilians at ONS.144 Though initially opposed by the military 
leadership during the reform process, this civilian-led architecture was achieved through 
the creation of the NSC and ONS.145 The ONS comprises the Central Intelligence Unit 
(CISU), which is responsible for all intelligence in the country including military 
intelligence, and reports directly to the president. This way, the dominance of the armed 
forces in some of the key state functions has been reduced along with their prerogatives.  
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In regard to the judiciary, RSLAF plays little or no role other than following the 
rules as provided by the country’s constitution and international obligations.146 The 
military has its own judicial system in line with the amended RSLAF Act of 1961, and 
conducts courts martial trials for very serious offenses such as treason committed by 
military personnel.147 The military courts do not try civilians. For example, thirty-four 
military personnel were tried and convicted by court martial in 1998 for offenses related to 
the 1997 military coup that sent the Kabba administration into exile in Guinea, while fifty-
seven civilians were separately tried in the High Courts of Sierra Leone for treason offenses 
in relation to the same military coup.148 Unlike its civilian counterpart, the military court 
system, which is yet to meet international standards of fair trial, lacks a higher tribunal for 
appeals after sentence. Generally, though, convicts given death sentences “have the right 
to seek clemency from a presidential committee for the prerogative of mercy.”149 
Nevertheless, the military justice system remains supported and guided by the civilian 
judicial architecture, which mitigates the military’s prerogatives.  
Table 1 summarizes the prevailing situation of military prerogatives in Sierra Leone 




146 Sierra Leone Legal Information Institute, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone.” 
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leone-34-soldiers-could-face-imminent-execution. 
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Table 1. Military Prerogatives Status*151 




None Military supports the police in internal 
security in accordance with national 
policy. 
2. Military relationship
to the chief of the
executive
Low The president is de jure and de facto 
commander-in-chief. 
3. Coordination of the
defense sector
Low De jure and de facto exercised by the two 
ministers of defense supported by civilian 
staff and military leaders at MOD. 
4. Active duty military
participation in the
cabinet
None Military not allowed by law, and not done. 
5. Role of the
legislature
Low Defense budget has to be explained and 
defended by MOD civilians in parliament. 
When required, military goes before 
defense committee for questioning. 
6. Role of senior career
civil servants or
political appointees
Moderate Civilian staff play leadership role at MOD 
in defense policies but greatly require 
military support in strategic defense policy 
development. 
7. Military role in
Intelligence
Moderate De jure and de facto controlled by civilian 
authorities. Military intelligence fused into 
centralized civilian intel report. 
8. Role in police Moderate Police has primacy in internal security 
while RSLAF provides support when 
required. 
9. Role in military
promotions
Moderate Military promotion boards make 
recommendations through defense council 
to executive; the latter approves, subject to 
parliament’s confirmation. 
10. Role in the state
enterprise
None Not allowed by law and practice. 
11. Role in the legal
system
Low No role in legal jurisdiction. Military is 
subject to both civil and military laws. 
Military handles its justice system to 
maintain military discipline and guard 
professionalism. 
*The status of military prerogatives in Sierra Leone in line with Stepan’s eleven military
prerogatives in a democracy.
151 Adapted from Stepan, 93–97. 
46 
Table 1 indicates the military’s prerogatives are generally low across a multitude 
of areas. This development differs from the period before democratization (1960s–1990s) 
when the military’s prerogatives were higher due in part to higher levels of 
politicization.152 At the time, the military viewed itself as having a big stake in state 
governance, as in the case of the military’s involvement in the stalemate of the 1967 
elections.153 The current institutional arrangement ensures the military does what the 
civilian authorities tell it to do, whether the instructions are in its favor or not, and fosters 
authority and democratic civilian control.  
On the side of institutional control, rows 5, 6, and 9 in Table 1 indicate that the 
civilian authorities are in control of the affairs of the military. The civilian-led defense 
council (headed by the president), for example, has final decision on military promotions 
and appointments, while the defense budget and spending are controlled and monitored by 
civilians at MOD and the parliament’s defense committee, respectively. These civilian-led 
institutions (the DC, MOD, and Defense Committee) have helped to reduce military 
prerogatives and enhanced civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone. For 
instance, the military’s financial expenditures are now handled and regulated by the 
civilians at MOD. Unlike in the past, the procurement of military equipment is now done 
by the civilians, which diminished the interests of the armed forces. 
In the area of financial management and control in the defense sector, the MOD 
civilian staff led by the director general, and the defense committee in parliament, play a 
crucial role and lead as shown in rows 5 and 6 of Table 1, assigning the military low to 
moderate prerogatives. In common with other ministries, departments, and agencies in the 
country, MOD prepares a detailed three-year tier of defense plans and estimates using the 
medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) and submits these plans for allocation of 
funding by the ministry of finance. Allocation of funding is contingent on availability of 
152 Berg, “Elite Bargains and External Influence,” 275. 
153 Cox, Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone, 114–15. 
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funds in the country.154 In this respect, despite the defense sector being critical for the 
government, it does not have preferential treatment. For instance, according to the SIPRI 
2020 database, the military budget expenditure has been decreasing for the past four years, 
from 2016 to 2019 (from $47.0 million in 2016 when it peaked, to $25.6 million in 
2019).155 Though the military leadership likely wants to receive what it asks for in the 
budget, the finance ministry allocates funding based on the government’s priorities and the 
funds available. The military, under the civilian leadership, operates within the new 
democratic framework established by the reform and conducts its operations in line with 
the interest of its civilian authorities.156 
The composition of representation in the Defense Council for both the military 
leadership and the civilian authorities rests at a ratio of almost 1:1.157 Thus, it becomes 
difficult for the armed forces to pursue any particular interest; for example, take unilateral 
decisions on military promotions, as shown in Table 1 in row 9, as every decision of the 
DC is sanctioned by its civilian leadership (the president). For example, in 2018, through 
the DC, the president promoted and appointed three generals, including Brigadiers 
Augustine Fefegula, Victor Samba, and Dauda Alpha, who were later confirmed by 
parliament.158 The Chief of Defense Staff (head of the armed forces) expressed gratitude 
to the president and commander-in-chief for the generals’ promotions, which came through 
recommendations from the MOD (DC);159 this process of effecting military promotions 
indicates civilian authority over the armed forces.  
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2. New Roles and Missions of the Military  
Though the military’s role in domestic security is not new, the increased 
engagement of Sierra Leone’s armed forces in the performance of domestic security roles 
and missions has occasionally posed challenges to democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces. Because the military performs such tasks, this role brings them closer to politics 
and makes the armed forces more nationally popular and powerful when state institutions 
are yet to be deeply rooted.160 The 2002 postwar reform created ways to have the military 
support the national police when they are overwhelmed through established national 
structures (NSC/ONS) and defense policies (MACA/DWP).161 The DWP helps to guide 
the military in its integration into internal security roles.162 The performance of the RSLAF 
in these activities has been generally lauded, especially in the areas of elections security, 
disaster response, and the country’s national cleaning exercises.163 These successes and 
praises earn more popularity for the military and increase public respect and trust for the 
armed forces.  
In the area of election security, the military, in collaboration with other security 
services, has been generally acclaimed to have exhibited the required professionalism for 
ensuring a secure environment for the conduct of democratic elections.164 For the four 
consecutive elections since the end of the civil war (2002, 2007, 2012, and 2018), the 
RSLAF has supported the police in ensuring a safe and secure environment, which 
 
160 In most democracies like the United States, military involvement in domestic security is not a 
welcome practice and may be interpreted as a constitutional contravention; however, in Sierra Leone, 
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culminated in generally peaceful and successful elections, and the smooth transfer of power 
between the two rival political parties in the country.165 In the 2018 elections, the Standing 
Together for Democracy Consortium in Sierra Leone, the UK department for international 
development (DFID) funded program in collaboration with Institute for Good Governance, 
Sierra Leone (IGR-SL), stated that 69 percent of the public believed the security forces 
ensured a secure environment for the conduct of the elections.166 The report mentioned 
that only five percent of the respondents in the survey stated having experienced violence 
while ten percent claimed to have heard some people being harassed. Additionally, the 
international community as well as other regional elections observers and NGOs such as 
the U.S.-based Carter Center, an NGO supporting democratic transformation in West 
Africa, indicated the general successes of the security sector in providing a secure electoral 
environment in the 2018 elections.167 As such, there has been an increased level of public 
trust for the military as it continues to demonstrate a satisfactory level of professionalism 
in the conduct of its duties. 
On the other hand, other quarters of the populace express contrasting views, 
especially about the military’s security role in the 2018 elections. The New York Times 
publication of April 4, 2018 noted the presence of heavily armed soldiers in the capital and 
other parts of the country, stating such a presence created an intimidating atmosphere for 
the voters.168 This assertion was, however, not substantiated. The executive director of the 
Institute for Governance Reform (IGR), Andrew Lavalie, stated that “the military’s 
presence was even higher than what the country had during the 1996 elections, when the 
country was still at war.”169 These accusations about the military, which need further 
substantiation, could be damaging to the military’s image, continued neutrality, and 
 
165 Godwin and Haenlein, 33; “Institute for Governance Reform – IGR,” 7, accessed January 17, 
2021, http://igrsl.org/. 
166 Institute for Governance Reform, “IGR Home page,” 7, accessed January 17, 2021, 
http://igrsl.org/. 
167 Carter Center, “March 7, 2018 - Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone - Final 
Report - Sierra Leone,” 43–45. 
168 Barry, “Sierra Leone’s Opposition Leader Is Sworn In as President,” April 4, 2018. 
169 Barry. 
50 
position of public trust if proven true. Because of the risks involved with elections security, 
the former Chief of Defense Staff, General Samuel Williams, detested the inclusion of the 
military in such sensitive and complicated tasks because he wanted to prevent it from being 
dragged into politics particularly when the armed forces were still professionalizing.170 
Nevertheless, RSLAF has so far generally proven professional in its conduct of 
elections security, as Freedom House also affirmed the non-involvement of the military in 
the 2012 elections. This was the first time the former military commander and head of the 
NPRC military regime, Brigadier (retired) Julius Maada Bio, contested and lost an 
election.171 It was generally speculated that the military was going to provide him all the 
necessary support as a former military comrade to win the election, but that did not happen; 
the RSLAF remained apolitical and ensured a widely acclaimed successful election 
professionally.172 Although the outcome and conduct of both the parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2018 were declared to be satisfactory by international observers, a 
Freedom House 2019 report determined them to be marred by political violence and voter 
intimidation.173  
In the areas of national cleaning exercises and disaster response, the RSLAF has 
received commendation nationally as well as in the sub-region for the military’s immense 
contribution to national service. For example, in the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the RSLAF, in 
collaboration with both local and international partners, assumed a prominent role in the 
coordination of the national response including erection of Ebola Treatment Centers 
following the appointment of the defense minister, Major (retired) Paolo Conteh, as head 
of the National Ebola Response Center (NERC).174 Just as in most West African countries, 
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the use of the military in responding to disasters is a common practice because is the armed 
services are readily available to governments and arguably equipped both in terms of 
personnel and equipment to respond to crises;175 hence, the military is employed in 
medical, logistical, and compliance enforcement roles. For Sierra Leone, the military 
covered the gap created by the inability of the country’s health ministry and the ONS to 
coordinate the response as required by the country.176 Because of the military’s successes 
in the Ebola response, a similar arrangement has been put in place to fight COVID-19 in 
the country. The RSLAF has again taken the lead with the defense minister, Brigadier 
(retired) Kellie Conteh, appointed as head of the National Covid-19 Virus Emergency 
Response Center (NACOVERC).177 While the military is actively engaged in ensuring 
compliance with the health regulations, its hospital (34 Military Hospital) currently serves 
as the only medical center for the management of COVID-19 patients in the country.178 
All of these military engagements serve as positive service to the nation, though the 
compliance enforcement role is not without controversy, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.179  
In sum, the military has engaged in a variety of internal roles and missions, and 
some of these have exposed it to the risk of politicization. The military could become too 
popular and powerful, and politicians could exploit these roles and missions for their own 
political advantage and thus jeopardize democratic control of the armed forces. Generally, 
however, the new roles have helped the military gain trust and popularity in the country as 
a force for democracy and the population’s well-being. These positive benefits are due to 
the mostly professional behavior of the troops when executing these missions. Thus, a 
tendency has been created for the RSLAF to be called upon as frequently as possible on 
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matters the police should handle. If politicians were to exploit this development, however, 
it could lead the military to become a threat to the regime when its interests are not met, as 
mentioned by Thomas Durell-Young.180  
3. Military Politicization  
The problem of military politicization that was largely responsible for the military’s 
past intervention in politics is presently not a challenge to civilian control of the RSLAF. 
This improvement has been the outcome of defense reform and the establishment of 
civilian-led institutions that have helped shield the military from politicization. The 
establishment of the civilian-led defense ministry and ONS, through which national 
security matters are coordinated, reduces direct dealings between the politicians and the 
military. Also, the construction of the military academy (Horton Academy) by IMATT for 
the education and training of senior and mid-level military officers, and other training 
schools, has helped increase the educational levels and defense knowledge of both officers 
and other ranks.181 Thus, these developments have increased both the RSLAF’s 
professionalism and understanding of the concepts of democratic governance, hence, 
enhancing the military’s acceptance of civilian supremacy. Today, the RSLAF is 
administered by the civilians and does what it is told by civilian authorities as manifested 
in their professional conduct of domestic security tasks as highlighted in previous sections. 
In the present circumstances, regular training and education given to the armed 
forces in Sierra Leone, and the continuing presence and mentoring of the UK-led ISAT, 
help to strengthen the military’s professionalism and acceptance of civilian authority. The 
military has adopted the attitude of refraining from politics as taught and trained, and 
conducts domestic tasks professionally without being partisan, which indicates the absence 
of politicization. For example, the RSLAF remained professional and neutral in the 2012 
presidential election even though many speculated the RSLAF was going to side with its 
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former military colleague who was one of the candidates. The military was widely removed 
from any election meddling, and this was corroborated by the 2012 Freedom House 
report.182 Equally, the Freedom House 2019 report showed the 2018 elections were 
generally pronounced credible though marred by violence and voter intimidation.183 While 
the Freedom House 2020 report does not cover much on security, the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED – a widely used real-time and analysis source 
on political violence and protests around the world) indicates in its 2020 report an increase 
in political violence and disorder from its 2018 elections data and involvement of the 
security forces in the intimidation of individuals.184  
4. Lack of Civilian Expertise or Interest in Defense Matters  
There is little data available on civilian defense expertise or parliamentary defense 
oversight specific to Sierra Leone. Thus, empirical evidence of the aspects of civilian 
defense expertise are based largely on the author’s work experience and reasoning in line 
with theoretical concepts.  
One indication that civilian expertise may be lacking at the MOD is that the civilian 
leadership, who is responsible for the administration and development of strategic defense 
documents, has not produced a national security strategy since the postwar reform.185 The 
delay could emanate from either a lack of interest, as explained in the literature on civilian 
expertise, or pending a lead from the ISAT mentors who are still playing a supervisory/
mentoring role at MOD. The national security strategy informs the development of a 
military strategy by the leadership of the military. The long wait for this national strategy 
could ultimately lead the military to take up the strategy’s development and frame it in 
their own interest—which in turn could diminish civilian control of the armed forces. 
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Hence, as explained in the literature, it becomes needful for civilians to acquire the right 
defense qualifications, training, and expertise as well as the interest to lead and direct the 
nation’s defense policies.186 
On the other hand, the defense reform established a democratic civilian authority 
framework at the MOD that allows the civilian staff to lead defense acquisition and 
procurement.187 Even so, the military has yet to have better and modern equipment for 
military operations, as evident in RSLAF’s dependence on external partners (UK and 
United States) for equipment provision to deploy on its peacekeeping operations in Somalia 
and Sudan in 2009 and 2014, respectively.188 For reasons that are difficult to establish, 
Sierra Leone has not been able to participate in peacekeeping missions as a troops 
contributing country (TCC) since RSLAF’s last mission in 2014, which could be a result 
of the withdrawal of external support for equipment. This lack of equipment affects the 
military’s operational effectiveness. Therefore, an unbalanced strategic defense 
prioritization ensues, which could result from civilian lack of interest or a limitation in 
defense expertise. Though such a situation has not been evident, it has the potential of 
eroding the confidence of the military leadership in its civilian leaders, which is detrimental 
to civilian control.  
Further, in spite of the enormous constitutional oversight powers provided to 
parliament, the members of the defense committee exercise notable defense financial 
oversight but exhibit little on the technical defense matters such as scrutinizing military 
structure and composition, military operations, and recruitment. This lack of 
comprehensive oversight, which could be due to limited defense knowledge or lack of 
interest, risks giving the executive the freedom, in addition to the massive provisions of the 
national instruments, to use the armed forces in its own interest, which could disadvantage 
political opponents and erode democratic control of the military.  
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Furthermore, apart from the consistent monitoring of defense budget and spending, 
and routine approvals of promotions and appointments of very senior military officers, it 
could be assessed that the parliament is passive in asserting authority on how and when the 
armed forces can be employed or called upon to execute internal security functions, or in 
scrutinizing the size of the military, its composition, promotions, and appointments. This 
situation, which might be driven by the lack of MPs’ expertise or interest in defense affairs, 
indicates constrained democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Sierra Leone’s 
parliament, as is the case in most countries, can ensure effective democratic civilian control 
if it knows how to conduct its oversight roles on the armed forces—that is, by having a 
wealth of knowledge on defense issues beyond finance and must be backed by the authority 
to execute its functions. The apparent limited knowledge or lack of interest in the oversight 
functions of the military results in the executive branch becoming the main player in all 
areas of the armed forces including recruitment, promotions, and the making of key 
command appointments; key command appointments simply receive routine parliament 
accession.  
B. OTHER ISSUES 
Though the focus of this thesis is on the domestic determinants of democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone, it is worth briefly mentioning another 
important issue that could undermine civilian control: external involvement. External 
involvement has risks associated despite being crucial for civil-military relations in Sierra 
Leone following the civil war. For Sierra Leone, these risks relate to the military viewing 
the reform process as a foreign concept or practice, and the issue of overdependence on 
foreign financing to sustain the reforms. If the military fails to accept and adopt the reforms, 
and the country lacks the resources to sustain the new structures and processes, the 
military’s general professionalism and the nascent institutions established by the reforms 
are put at risk, which will as a whole subvert civilian control. Fortunately, this has not yet 
been the case, as the British-led IMATT/ISAT has so far been able to enhance 
professionalization of the RSLAF and improve its operational effectiveness in executing 
assigned national tasks. It, however, remains to be seen how these gains will be sustained 
if or when the British assistance/support and mentoring is completely withdrawn.  
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On the other hand, external involvement has downsides. External actors often have 
vested political or economic interests that drive their involvement. In the case of Sierra 
Leone, the UK funded most of the reform process, purged officers that wanted to resist 
change with the backing of the government, and introduced its model of dual civilian-
military partnership.189 Its interest has been to ensure the Tejan Kabba administration is 
sustained, and the armed forces brought under civilian control. Though this transformation 
remains very significant, its sustainability becomes a vital concern in the absence of 
adequate economic strength coupled with weak institutional oversight in Sierra Leone. As 
Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake put it, “one of the enduring tests of a 
reformed security sector reform (in addition to operational effectiveness) is the extent to 
which the security establishment is democratically governed.”190 If the institutions to 
uphold the reforms are not adequately resourced and strengthened, there is the possibility 
to lose the gains already made. In Sierra Leone, the fate of the nascent civilian-led 
institutions remains to be seen in the wake of the country’s weak economy to sustain the 
functions of these institutions.  
C. INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
In sum, the four aspects of military prerogatives, new roles and missions, military 
politicization, and limited civilian defense expertise are all interrelated in terms of their 
impacts on democratic civilian control. None of these stands completely alone. The 
engagement of the military in many domestic security tasks in the circumstances of weak 
institutions, coupled with limited civilian defense expertise and much executive power, all 
pose risks to each other and could work in tandem to undermine democratic civilian control 
of the armed forces.  
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The internal roles and missions are not so problematic if the military continues to 
professionally execute them and accept civilian supremacy. The conduct of domestic 
security tasks such as policing elections is highly sensitive and requires a great 
demonstration of professionalism and neutrality. The prospect of politicians drawing the 
military into partisan politics remains high, though, especially when institutions are not 
effective enough to delineate and guard the boundaries of such military engagements.  
Civilian expertise will not matter much as long as military prerogatives remain low 
and the military remains outside of politics. When the prerogatives of the military remain 
low as in the current case of Sierra Leone, the civilian leadership’s gaps in defense 
knowledge will unnoticeably be filled by the military in a mutual civilian-military 
partnership without the military losing confidence in its civilian leadership. Nonetheless, 
this situation depends on the level of military subordination and acceptance of civilian 
supremacy. Thus, to avert the risk of increased military prerogatives, it is critical to enhance 
civilian defense knowledge at both the MOD and the legislature.  
Further, although formal oversight is the responsibility of the three branches of 
government including the executive, judiciary, and parliament, there is overwhelming 
control from the executiveas provided both by the constitution of Sierra Leone, and in 
practice. Yet, balanced oversight is required, especially from the parliament, but that 
oversight remains low, perhaps due to limited defense knowledge. This weakness in 
parliamentary oversight, which may give abundant freedom of control and use of the 
military to the president-executive, obscures democratic control and has ramifications for 
the consolidation of democracy. The literature on achieving democratic civilian control 
through institutionalization establishes the essence of institutional oversight, and 
emphasizes the key role played by parliament in serving as checks and balances over the 
excesses of the executive.191 The current situation in Sierra Leone that is characterized by 
weak oversight by the relevant institutions both formal (especially parliament) and 
informal (media, civil-society, NGOs) has the potential to provide more leverage to the 
military to become closer to the executive and eventually get dragged into politics. For 
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now, the presently established civilian-led structures/institutions are preventing that 
possibility. Nevertheless, once the armed forces become closer to the executive and 
politics, the potential exists for politicians (the regime) to use the RSLAF to their advantage 
and subvert democratization, as other democratic players become deprived of their role 
within the system.  
The limited civilian defense expertise or lack of interest in defense matters and the 
engagement of the military in new roles have been identified as the most important current 
challenges to democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone. Given the 
interrelationships discussed previously, if either of the other two factors (military 
prerogatives and politicization) worsens, there could be much broader problemsnot only 
for democratic civilian control but also for the consolidation of the nascent democracy in 
the country. With the military executing domestic security tasks, especially providing 
elections security and quelling civil protests or street violence, the RSLAF becomes prone 
to politicization. Where the military fails to remain professional and neutral in policing 
elections, its public trust will be eroded as political opponents of the regime will lose trust 
in it and assess the military to be partisan. As a key national instrument for democratic 
consolidation, the military requires the public trust or risks negative impacts on 
democratization.192 Public trust in state institutions like the military is key to democratic 
consolidation because of its significant role in sustaining democracy. This is especially true 
when institutionsboth formal and informal, including political opponentsshare the 
responsibility of controlling the armed forces in a democratic environment.  
It is common in consolidating democracies in Africa, especially those with 
presidential systems, for the executive to be tempted to use the military to achieve set 
national goals; this temptation could be contentious if the other branches of government 
and informal institutions, such as the media and civil-society, are left out of the decision-
making process. Thus, the effective participation of the three branches of government and 
the informal institutions becomes relevant for democratic civilian control.  
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D. CONCLUSION  
Based on the assessment in this chapter, the main challenges of civilian control in 
Sierra Leone are the engagement of the military in many new roles and missions and the 
limited defense knowledge or lack of interest of civilian leaders within the MOD and 
parliament. There are also risks that politicization and high prerogatives of the military 
could emerge as challenges in the longer term; at the moment, they have been suppressed 
by the positive impacts of the 2002 defense reforms. Although much progress has been 
achieved in institutionalizing democratic civilian control of the armed forces, if the 
observed challenges observed are not addressed, they have the potential to escalate, 
distorting civilian control and generally adversely impacting the country’s gradual process 
of democratic consolidation.  
The weaknesses in civilian control of the armed forces due to the RSLAF’s new 
roles and missions and civilian leadership’s limited defense knowledge could undermine 
democratic consolidation as the armed forces will have the room to pursue their interests; 
and hence, revert to their old practices of intervening in politics and becoming a threat to 
civilian administration. It is therefore prudent that the current challenges are addressed to 
ensure effective democratic civilian control of the military, Ultimately, this will help to 
consolidate democracy with the contribution of the armed forces.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has explored the challenges of democratic civilian control over the 
armed forces of Sierra Leone. Effective democratic civilian control of the military is pivotal 
for national stability and the process of democratic consolidation. For Sierra Leone, just as 
for most developing democracies in Africa, civilian control of the armed forces is important 
because of the number of military coups and counter coups it has experienced in the past. 
The process of establishing civilian control over the military is cumbersome. Hence, 
despite the country’s postwar reform in 2002, democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces remains incomplete. To answer my question on the current challenges facing civilian 
control of the armed forces, I proposed four hypotheses that relate to: 1) military 
prerogatives; 2) military roles and missions; 3) military politicization and acceptance of 
civilian supremacy; 4) lack of civilian defense expertise or interest in defense matters. This 
chapter provides a summary of the key findings of the thesis and proffers feasible 
recommendations for defense policymakers in Sierra Leone. The chapter ends with 
suggestions for additional avenues of research.  
A. SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS 
The current situation of civilian control of the armed forces in Sierra Leone appears 
encouraging due to the positive impact of the postwar reform and the transformation of the 
RSLAF. However, among the four assumptions just mentioned, the thesis finds that the 
aspects of the military’s engagement in domestic security, especially in policing elections, 
and the limited civilian defense expertise or lack of civilian interest have an immediate and 
high potential to pose as challenges to the democratic civilian control of the armed forces 
in Sierra Leone. Both challenges have not manifested in an observable way, which makes 
it a little difficult to clearly identify their effects, but a few instances indicate their potential 
problems. Table 2 provides a summary of the findings based on the four hypotheses.  
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Table 2. Summary of Findings  
 
1. Roles and Missions 
In the area of domestic security (new roles and missions), rows 3 of Table 2 shows 
that though the country’s national policies, including the military aid to civil power 
(MACA) and the defense white paper, legitimize the military’s support to the Sierra Leone 
police, the military’s engagement in elections security and quelling of street violence brings 
it closer to politics, which makes RSLAF vulnerable to politicization, especially as it is still 
professionalizing. Thus, there is a high risk for the military to be politicized while engaging 
in the policing of elections. For example, during the 2018 elections, the military and police 
were accused of turning a blind eye to the beating of a journalist from one of the local 
presses, as if to ensure a peaceful electoral environment by responding to the violence the 
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military and the police would be considered biased.193 Such a response could easily be 
misconstrued as the security forces taking sides with the political party that might have 
been behind the beating of the reporter. Also, when the military is heavily deployed with 
arms for election security, as mentioned by the IGR executive director in the April 4 edition 
of The New York Times that year,194 it is intimidating for voters, particularly those in 
opposition who may not fully know the level of neutrality of the military. Therefore, the 
execution of some sensitive domestic security tasks like policing elections exposes the 
military to higher risks of politicization by civilian elites who could be seeking an 
advantage over their political opponents.  
The situation is different from the engagement on disaster response tasks and 
national cleaning exercises. The military has been integral in responding to the impacts of 
natural disasters, which fall within the new roles and missions of the armed forces and have 
contributed to increasing the military’s popularity and public trust.195 As part of the 
positives of the reform, RSLAF’s operational effectiveness underscores their performance 
in the execution of disaster response tasks such as in the cases of the country’s Ebola 
epidemic in 2014/15, the mudslide of 2017, and the present COVID-19 pandemic.196  
Even so, while some of these internal security tasks may only increase the 
popularity of the military, others place it at high risk of politicization. Hence, the mitigation 
of risks in the tasks of elections security and quelling of street violence depends on how 
professional, neutral, and resilient the military remains during the conduct of such sensitive 
tasks. Conversely, in the circumstance where institutions are deeply rooted and 
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functioning, effective oversight on the military will mitigate the risks of politicization while 
the military performs domestic security functions.  
2. Civilian Leadership’s Defense Expertise and Level of Interest 
With regard to civilian defense expertise, row 4 of Table 2 indicates the risk 
associated with low civilian defense knowledge is moderate to high. While such 
information is limited, the thesis finds that the continued supervisory and mentoring role 
of the UK-led ISAT at the MOD is an apparent indicator of progress, but it also reveals 
that the civilian staff are yet to be fully knowledgeable in their strategic defense roles and 
responsibilities—and most importantly—in the area of strategic policy development. Since 
the reform was completed in 2005, the country has yet to develop a national security 
strategy to guide the development of a military strategy. This failure may be a result of 
either limited defense knowledge or a lack of interest on the part of the civilian leadership. 
Similarly, the deficiencies in the effective balancing of defense priorities with resources, 
for example, the failure to procure the adequate peacekeeping military equipment, points 
to civilian leadership’s limited qualifications or preparedness.  
The same limitation in defense knowledge or lack of interest affects the parliament 
in its execution of oversight roles. The parliament, with its expansive constitutional powers, 
has been robust with defense financial oversight but less so on technical matters of defense. 
Defense issues related with military structure and composition, recruitment, promotions, 
appointments, and military operations are largely dealt with by the executive and the 
defense council. The authority of the commander-in-chief over the armed forces as 
contained in sections 167 to 169 of the Sierra Leone 1991 constitution remains more visible 
than parliament’s involvement. This limited oversight by parliament as well as the limited 
interest of civilian staff in strategic defense matters at MOD weakens democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces, thereby influencing either the power of the military or making 
the executive dominant over the control of the military.  
3. Military Prerogatives and Politicization 
The other two hypotheses, military prerogatives and politicization, remain low at 
the moment as indicated by rows 1 and 2 in Table 2, most probably due to the 2002 reform. 
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The reform enhanced the military’s professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy, 
which is evident in its conduct of internal security tasks as explained in the previous 
sections, and created oversight institutions for the democratic control of the armed forces. 
This development gives less room for the military to pursue its own interest as well as 
limits the likelihood of the military’s politicization. Nonetheless, to sustain and improve 
on these low levels of risk, the two challenges identified need to be resolved.  
Therefore, any failure to address the risks involved with domestic security tasks 
and the lack of interest or civilian defense expertise will have a direct impact on military 
politicization and an increase in military prerogatives. Thus, all of the four assumptions are 
interrelated. These four assumptions work in tandem to potentially constrain democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces and erode the prospects for democratic consolidation 
in Sierra Leone. Therefore, these four aspects need to be addressed simultaneously to 
ensure effective democratic control of the armed forces.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The sustainability of and further improvement on the current gains from the defense 
reform largely depend on the continued professionalization of the military, its ability to 
remain apolitical through consistent training and education on democratic governance, and 
the strengthening of state institutions for effective democratic oversight of the armed 
forces. The continued professionalization of the military and its acceptance of the authority 
of civilians, along with the strengthening of state institutions, will not only address the risks 
involved with the RSLAF’s domestic security roles and the lack of civilian defense 
expertise or interest, but will also counter the potential problems of military politicization 
and prerogatives. Thus, the following recommendations are focused on areas of 
strengthened military professionalization and acceptance of civilian supremacy, 
improvement of civilian defense expertise and interest, increased institutional control, and 
more effective resource provision.  
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1. Strengthening Military Professionalism and Attachment to Civilian 
Supremacy 
Military professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy are critical elements 
to the enhancement of democratic civilian control as mentioned in the literature on 
professionalism and its connection to civilian control. The relevance of these aspects has 
been manifested after RSLAF’s reform in its current operational effectiveness and its 
adoption of an apolitical attitude. Therefore, the government should give priority to 
enhancing this environment by continuing military education, training, and ethics 
development. The following should therefore be prioritized:  
• Establishing more and better quality military academies and training 
centers where personnel will be taught issues of democratic governance, 
civil-military relations, professional norms, and the importance of civilian 
supremacy.  
• Ensuring civilian authorities recruit individuals with the right 
qualifications to avert difficulties in improving levels of education among 
the military.  
• Participation of the RSLAF in peacekeeping operations to gain experience 
and enhance the professional ethics, knowledge, and operational 
effectiveness of the armed forces through interaction with foreign 
militaries. This participation will also keep the RSLAF away from politics.  
These structures, once in place, will help to increase the military’s level of 
professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy.  
2. Improving Civilian Leadership’s Defense Expertise and Interest  
The importance of civilian expertise and interest in defense and security has been 
emphasized in the literature. It is essential to ensuring the armed forces are administered 
and controlled so as to cause them to remain subordinated and to accept the leadership and 
direction of the civilians. Hence, increasing the knowledge and interest of civilians in 
defense matters remains crucial. Therefore, the following should be given consideration:  
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• Enhancing the defense education of the civilians, with emphasis on more 
technical matters of strategic policy development.  
• Reviewing the policy on employment rotations to enable the civilian staff 
at the MOD to stay for much longer periods and reduce the need to train 
and educate fresh staff. In this way, experienced civilian staff will not be 
quickly lost to other MDAs.  
• Offering opportunities for personal advancement in terms of further 
education, attractive emoluments or incentives, and pensions as part of the 
conditions of service to increase the interest of civilian staff in executing 
their responsibilities.  
3. Increasing Institutional Control  
Functioning state institutions can mitigate the problems associated with domestic 
security and limited civilian defense expertise through effective oversight, and can thereby 
sustain democratic civilian control of the military. Further, the institutions should be given 
the latitude and capacity to operate and perform their roles within a democratic framework. 
Therefore, the following should be given consideration:  
• Defining clearly in the national constitution and other associated legal 
instruments the authority of oversight over the armed forces by all the 
relevant institutions, including government branches and non-
governmental institutions.  
• Creating the environment for a balanced participation of all the branches 
of government in the oversight of the armed forces.  
• Integrating other non-governmental institutions such as the media, civil-
society, and NGOs in the performance of oversight for the armed forces.  
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4. Providing Adequate Resources  
To sustain the gains of the reform and the continued subordination of the military 
to civilian control, priority should be given to the provision of adequate resources for both 
the military and the oversight institutions. Government should place attention on the 
following areas:  
• Equipping the military to enhance its participation in peacekeeping 
operations and its ability to keep up with the standards of other African 
countries, especially within the sub-region.  
• Addressing issues of the military’s conditions of service, including 
salaries, housing, pensions, and uniform to maintain its morale.  
C. OTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES  
This thesis complements the limited scholarship on civil-military relations in Sierra 
Leone, especially from 1996 when democracy was introduced and onward. To further 
develop the literature on Sierra Leone’s civil-military relations, future research could be 
done on how challenges to civilian control of the military have impacted the consolidation 
of democracy in the country. Also, it may be worth investigating the nexus between defense 
reforms and professionalization in relation to military democratization. This nexus will 
help ascertain whether the reform is actually responsible for the eventual increase in the 
military’s professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy, or whether it may such 
changes in the military are attributable to the wave of politics and relative stability in the 
country. Such research opportunities will be relevant not only for Sierra Leone but also the 
region.  
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